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Abstract
This paper analyzes the inﬂuence of risk and the expenditure policy
of the public sector in a two-country stochastic AK growth model
where public spending is utility-enhancing. Having characterized the
macroeconomic equilibrium ﬁrst we study the impact of risk and the
public sector on consumption-wealth ratio, growth and welfare, given
the exogenous size of the public sector. A higher weight of public
consumption in the utility function raises the rate of growth due to a
fall in the consumption-wealth ratio. Then we show that consumption-
wealth ratio and welfare are higher in an open economy than in a
closed economy and we study whether open economies grow more
than closed economies. Next, the welfare-maximizing size of the public
sector is derived and compared it to the size that maximizes growth.
We analyze the impact of exogenous parameters, risk specially, on
the optimal size. Then we establish that a higher weight of public
consumption in the utility function reduces private consumption-wealth
ratio leaving the rate of growth unchanged when the size of the public
sector is optimally chosen. Finally, we show that more open economies
should have a higher size of the public sector under more general
conditions than those established in Turnovsky (1999).
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21I N T R O D U C T I O N
The role of government expenditure policy in the long run behavior of the
economy has received considerable attention in recent years, specially due
to the advent of endogenous growth models. That is not surprising since
in the Solow-Swan neoclassical growth model “conventional macroeconomic
policy had no inﬂuence on long-run growth performance” (Turnovsky, 2003,
p. 1). Barro (1990) pioneered the analysis based on a closed economy
deterministic AK growth model where public spending inﬂuences utility.1
This has led to others, Turnovsky (1996, 1999) for example, to incorporate
small open economy features and risk into endogenous growth models where
public spending is utility-enhancing. Thus substantial conclusions have been
derived regarding the impact of risk and the expenditure policy of the public
sector on the economy, and the optimal size of the public sector, provided
that the spending of the public sector enhances utility. However, analysis
based on two-country stochastic models are badly needed, specially when
ﬁnancial markets are becoming increasingly integrated.
This paper analyzes the inﬂuence of risk and the expenditure policy of
the public sector by incorporating utility-enhancing public spending [see
Barro (1990)] into a two-country stochastic AK growth model developed by
Turnovsky (1997, Ch. 11). Then the size of the public sector that maximizes
welfare can be endogenously derived, instead of exogenously given as in
Turnovsky (1997, Ch. 11). Previous papers introduced risk into endogenous
growth models, but public spending was neither utility-enhancing nor pro-
ductive [see, for example, Eaton (1981)]. Turnovsky (1996) extended Barro’s
(1990) closed economy model by incorporating utility-enhancing government
expenditure into a deterministic endogenous growth small open economy.
Turnovsky (1999) added risk to a small open economy. Therefore our model
has been built up combining the main characteristics of the core literature2:
• It is an AK growth model, as the rest of the models.
• It is a two-country model, following the framework set out by Turnovsky
(1997, chap. 11), whereas the rest of the models are one-country models
(either a closed economy or small open economy).
• Public consumption is utility enhancing, following the original work by
1Barro (1990) also analyzed the role of productivity-enhancing government expenditure.
2We denominate “core literature” to the set of papers that have analyzed the impact of
risk and/or the expenditure policy of the public sector on the economy based on AK growth
models, provided that public spending is utility-enhancing, and to the model developed
by Turnovsky (1997, Ch. 11).
3Barro (1990). Thus the model is able to determine the size of the public
sector that maximizes the welfare of the representative agent, as most
of the models of the core literature do. Turnovsky (1997) is the only
model that cannot analyze the magnitude of such a size, since public
spending is neither utility enhancing nor productive, so that “it can be
interpreted as being a real drain on the economy or, alternatively, as
some public good that does not aﬀect the marginal utility of private
consumption or the productivity of private capital” (Turnovsky, 1997,
p. 338). Turnovsky (1996, 1999) extend Barro´s (1990) model from a
closed economy to a small open economy setting.
• The model is stochastic. The only models of the core literature that are
not stochastic are Barro (1990) and Turnovsky (1996). In this respect
Turnovsky (1999) extends the deterministic models in Barro (1990) and
Turnovsky (1996) to a stochastic setting.
Table 2.1. encapsulates the relationship between the model of this paper
and the core literature.
Table 2.1. An overview of the model
The diﬀerent AK Two Size of the Stochastic
models growth countries public sector shocks
Barro (1990) X X
Turnovsky (1996) X X
Turnovsky (1997, chap. 11) X X X
Turnovsky (1999) X X X
This model X X X X
We think that this model can be specially useful in the present moment
of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). First, countries
of the euro area have adopted the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) from
1st January 1999 onwards, whose objective is that countries of the euro
area must attain budget balance, in the medium or in the long run, so
that the assumption of continuous budget balance that we make in this
paper seems reasonable. Second, the emphasis of this paper is the long
run and, therefore, it does not focus on the inﬂuence of business cycles,
important as they may be. Third, there exists a recurrent preoccupation
regarding whether the shocks that aﬀect European countries are becoming
more idiosyncratic (asymmetric) or not and the consequences of such a
pattern. In this paper we pay special attention to the inﬂuence that the
4pattern of correlation between domestic and foreign productivity shocks, and
public spending shocks generate on the world economy, whereas the core
literature has not analyzed such an issue. Fourth, there is a permanent
debate about whether the size of the public sector should be bigger or
smaller and, more speciﬁcally, whether more open economies should have
bigger governments or not. Rodrik (1998) showed that economies that are
more open to international trade have bigger governments and argues that
it is due to the fact that government spending provides social insurance
against external risk. However, Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) show that the
link between the size of the public sector and openness can be explained
alternatively on the grounds that a higher size of the public sector is related
to small economies (due to the economies of scale involved in the provision of
public goods) and that small economies are usually more open to trade. Then
country size is the variable that can account for the positive relation between
the size of the public sector and the openness to trade. This model sheds
some light on the issue, since it compares the size of the public sector that
maximizes the welfare in an open economy with that in a closed economy.
We start analyzing the impact of risk and the public sector on consumption-
wealth ratio, the rate of growth of assets and welfare, once the macroeconomic
equilibrium has been characterized. Then we compare the results of an open
economy in contrast to those of a closed economy. Next, we derive the
welfare-maximizing size of the public sector, we discuss whether maximizing
growth is equivalent to maximizing welfare and we analyze the impact of exo-
genous parameters, risk specially, on the optimal size. We discuss whether
more open economies should have a higher size of the public sector. Finally,
we conclude indicating possible avenues for future research.
2 THE WORLD ECONOMY
2.1 The basic structure
The world economy is composed of two countries, each of them producing
only one homogeneous good. In each country there exists a representative
agent and the public sector, both with inﬁnite time horizon. This economy
is a real one, that is, there are no nominal assets, such as money, diﬀerent
ﬁnancial assets, etc. Unstarred variables refer to the domestic economy,
whereas the starred variables refer to the foreign economy. Developing this
model we focus on the domestic economy since the results for the foreign
economy are very similar.
The homogeneous good produced by both countries can be either consu-
5med or invested in capital without having to incur in any kind of adjustment
costs. We are going to suppose that domestic production can be obtained
using only domestic capital, K, through an AK function, and that it can
be expressed through a ﬁrst order stochastic diﬀerential equation, so that
production ﬂow dY (the variation of the state variable) is not completely
determined, but it is subject to a stochastic disturbance
dY = αKdt+ αKdy,
where α > 0 is the (constant) marginal physical product of capital and dy
represents a proportional domestic productivity shock. More precisely, dy
is the increment of a stochastic process y. Those increments are temporally
independent and are normally distributed, satisfying that E(dy)=0and
E(dy2)=σ2
ydt.3 We omit, for convenience, the formal references to time,
although those variables depend on time. We must note that dY indicates the
ﬂow of production, instead of Y , as is ordinarily done in stochastic calculus.
The foreign economy is structured symmetrically to the domestic eco-
nomy. Thus, foreign production is carried out using capital domiciled abroad,









where α∗ > 0 is the marginal physical product of capital and dy∗ represents a
proportional foreign productivity shock. More precisely, dy∗ is the increment
of a stochastic process y∗. Those increments are temporally independent and
are distributed normally, satisfying that E(dy∗)=0and that E(dy∗2)=
σ2
y∗dt.
Both the domestic capital, K, and the foreign capital, K∗,c a nb eo w n e d
by the domestic representative agent or the foreign representative agent. The
subscript d denotes the holdings of assets of the domestic representative agent
and the subscript f denotes the holdings of assets of the foreign representative
agent. So it must be satisﬁed that







The wealth of the domestic representative agent, W,a n dt h ew e a l t ho f
the foreign representative agent, W ∗, therefore will be
3That is, the production ﬂow follows a Brownian motion with drift αK a n dw i t hv a r i -
ance α2K2σ2
y.




∗ = Kf + K
∗
f. (2)
2.2 The domestic economy
2.2.1 The problem
The preferences of the domestic representative agent are represented by a
constant elasticity of substitution (or isoelastic) intertemporal utility function















−∞ < γ < 1;η > 0;γη < 1;γ(1 + η) < 1.
The welfare of the domestic representative agent in period 0 is the expected
value of the discounted sum of instantaneous utilities, conditioned on the
set of disposable information in period 0. The parameter β is a positive
subjective discount rate (or rate of time preference). For the isoelastic utility
function the Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is given by the
expression 1 − γ.W h e nγ =0this function corresponds to the logarithmic
utility function. The empirical evidence suggests a high degree of relative risk
aversion, so that γ < 0 (Campbell, 1996). The parameter η measures the
inﬂuence of public consumption on the welfare of the domestic representative
agent. We suppose that both private consumption and public consumption
generate a positive marginal utility, so that η > 0. The other restrictions on
the utility function are necessary to ensure concavity with respect to private
consumption and public consumption.
The domestic representative agent consumes at a deterministic rate C(t)dt
in the instant dt and must pay the corresponding taxes and thus the dynamic
budget restriction can be expressed in the following way
dW =[ αKd + α
∗K
∗




∗] − Cdt− dT, (4)
where dT denotes the taxes the domestic representative agent must pay to
the public sector. The structure of taxes will be detailed below.
7Besides the domestic representative agent there is a public sector. Public
sector spending, dG, increases with wealth, so that we can achieve a balanced
growth path4. Public spending evolves according to
dG = gWdt+ Wdz, (5)
where g = G/W is the size of the public sector and dz is the increment of
a stochastic process z. Those increments are temporally independent and
are normally distributed, satisfying that E(dz)=0and E(dz2)=σ2
zdt.
Public sector spending is ﬁnanced solely via tax collection: the public sector
equilibrates its budget continuously, which seems reasonable in the long run,
as is the focus of this paper. Therefore, public deﬁcits are not allowed, that
is,
dT = dG. (6)
Combining equations (6), (5), and substituting them into (4), we get the
following restriction for the resources of the domestic economy
dW =[ αKd + α
∗K
∗




∗ − Wdz]. (7)
Let us remember that the holding of assets by the domestic representative
agent is subject to the domestic wealth equation (1). If we deﬁne the following












= share of the domestic portfolio materialized
in foreign capital,




4Other rules can also achieve a balanced growth path. See Turnovsky (1996) for more
details.
8and substituting those variables into the budget constraint (7) we obtain the

















∗ − dz]. (9)
This equation can be more conveniently expressed as
dW
W
= ψdt + dw, (10)
where the deterministic and stochastic parts of the rate of accumulation of
assets, dW/W, can be expressed in the following way
ψ ≡ nd [α − α
∗]+α
∗ − g −
C
W








∗ − dz, (12)
where ρ ≡ αnd + α∗n∗
d ≡ nd [α − α∗]+α∗ denotes the gross rate of return of
the asset portfolio.
2.2.2 The equilibrium
The objective of the domestic representative agent consists in choosing the
path of private consumption and portfolio shares that maximize the expected
value of the intertemporal utility function (3), subject to W(0) = W0,
(10), (11), and (12). This optimization is a stochastic optimum control
problem.5 Initially we are going to suppose that the government establishes
an arbitrarily exogenous size of the public sector, g.W ea n a l y z et h ec a s ei n
which such a size is chosen optimally in section 4.
It is important to bear in mind that the domestic agent takes as given the
r a t e so fr e t u r no fd i ﬀerent assets, as well as the corresponding variances and
covariances. However, these parameters will endogenously be determined in
the macroeconomic equilibrium we are going to obtain.
The ﬁrst step in order to solve this optimization problem is to introduce
a value function, V (W),w h i c hi sd e ﬁned as
5To solve problems of stochastic optimum control see, for example, Kamien and
Schwartz (1991, section 22), Malliaris and Brock (1982, ch. 2), Obstfeld (1992), or












subject to the restrictions (10), (11), and (12) and given initial wealth. The
value function in period 0 is the expected value of the discounted sum of
instantaneous utilities, evaluated along the optimal path, starting in period
0i nt h es t a t eW(0) = W0.
Second, starting from equation (13) the value function must satisfy the
following equation, known as the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of sto-
















Third, we diﬀerentiate partially (14) with respect to C and nd in order












The solution to this problem is obtained through trial and error. We seek
to ﬁnd a value function V (W) that satisﬁes, on the one hand, the ﬁrst order
optimality conditions and, on the other, the Bellman equation. In the case of
isoelastic utility functions the value function has the same form of the utility










00(W)=Aγ(1 + η)[γ(1 + η) − 1]W
γ(1+η)−2.
Substituting these expressions in the ﬁrst order optimality conditions (15)
and (16) we get that
10C
γ−1G
ηγ = Aγ(1 + η)W
γ(1+η)−1 (18)
(α − α
∗)dt =[ 1 − γ(1 + η)]cov [dw,αdy − α
∗dy
∗]. (19)
Both are typical equations in stochastic models in continuous time. Equation
(18) indicates that at the optimum, the marginal utility derived from private
consumption must be equal to the marginal change in the value function
or the marginal utility of wealth. Equation (19) shows us that the optimal
choice of portfolio shares of the domestic representative agent must be such
that the risk-adjusted rates of return of both domestic and foreign capital
are equalized.
Combining (18) and (19), and substituting them in the equation (14), we
can calculate, after some algebra, the equilibrium portfolio shares and the
consumption-wealth ratio in the domestic open economy
nd =
α − α∗
[1 − γ(1 + η)]∆
+
α∗2σ2













(1 − γ)(1 + η)
[β − γ(1 + η)(ρ − g)






































Please note that neither the expression ∆ nor the variance of the rate of
accumulation of domestic assets, σ2
w,o, can be negative and the variables
with the subscript o refer to values in an open economy.
Then the equilibrium rate of wealth accumulation of the open domestic
economy follows the stochastic process
dW
W
= ψodt + dwo, (25)
where the deterministic and stochastic components are, respectively
11ψo =
1
(1 − γ)(1 + η)
{(1 + η)(ρ − g) − β









∗ − dz. (27)
Even though with more general utility functions portfolio shares and
consumption-wealth ratio will be functions of time, in this model all those
variables are constants because the utility function exhibits constant relative
risk aversion, the production function is linear, and the mean and variances
of the underlying stochastic processes are stationary: the equilibrium is
characterized by balanced real growth, where all the (real) assets grow at the
same rate, and by constant consumption-wealth ratio and portfolio shares.
Additionally we should observe that portfolio shares do not depend on the
size of the public sector, but they do depend on the degree of relative risk
aversion. The result is very similar to Turnovsky (1997, ch. 11). However,
we should note that portfolio shares depend, in addition, on the parameter
that reﬂects the inﬂuence of public consumption in the utility function of
t h ed o m e s t i cr e p r e s e n t a t i v ea g e n t ,η. The same is also true for the foreign
economy, as we shall see below.
Now we are going to describe the behavior of the domestic economy if it
were closed in order to compare the results of an open economy with those of
a closed economy later on. In a model of perfect capital mobility such as this,
where domestic and foreign assets are traded without restrictions, we use the
shares of the domestic portfolio materialized in domestic and foreign capital,
nd and n∗
d respectively, to approximate the degree of openness of the domestic
economy. Since our emphasis is on the trade of assets, then we are calling
closed economy to the situation where there is no trade of assets. However,
we should bear in mind that what we call closed economy is compatible with
positive amounts of exports and imports, but subject to the restriction that
the trade of goods must be balanced. For the case of a closed economy the








(1 − γ)(1 + η)
{β − γ(1 + η)(α − g)












z − 2ασyz (29)
ψc =
1
(1 − γ)(1 + η)
{(1 + η)(α − g) − β





dwc = αdy − dz,
where the variables with the subscript c refer to values in a closed economy.
To guarantee that consumption is positive in the domestic open economy
we impose the feasibility condition that the marginal propensity to consume
out of wealth must be positive since wealth does not become negative
1
(1 − γ)(1 + η)
{β − γ(1 + η)(ρ − g)





For the ﬁrst order optimality conditions to characterize a maximum, the
corresponding second order condition must be satisﬁed, that is, the Hessian
matrix associated to the maximization problem and evaluated at the optimal
values of the choice variables
"













where ∆ > 0 (in a risky economy) was already deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 2 3 ) .
To evaluate those conditions ﬁr s tw eo b t a i nt h ev a l u eo ft h ec o e ﬃcient A in
equation (18)









where C/W is the optimal value pointed out by equation (22). Then we
substitute (31) into the value function (17). Noting that g = G/W,t h e










where we can observe that, given the restrictions on the utility function,
V 0(W) > 0 and V 00(W) < 0 provided that C/W > 0.
In addition, we impose that the macroeconomic equilibrium must satisfy








Now let us show that should the feasibility condition be satisﬁed then that
would be equivalent to satisfy the transversality condition.7 To evaluate (33),
we start expressing the dynamics of the accumulation of wealth
dW = ψWdt+ Wdw. (34)
















7See Merton (1969). Turnovsky (2000) provides, for example, the proof of the
transversality condition as well.
8See Malliaris and Brock (1982, pp. 135-136), for example.
9See Malliaris and Brock (1982, pp. 137-138), for example.
14The transversality condition (33) will be satisﬁed if and only if
γ(1 + η)
©




− β < 0.





and thus feasibility guarantees convergence as well.
Finally, we should note that since the public sector equilibrates its budget
continuously then the intertemporal budget constraint of the public sector is
satisﬁed trivially.
2.3 The foreign economy
2.3.1 The problem
The problem facing the foreign representative agent can be formulated in an




















The equation of the rate of accumulation of wealth of the foreign repre-






























[1 − γ∗(1 + η∗)]∆
+
α∗2σ2



















































The equilibrium rate of accumulation of wealth in the foreign economy



































In this section ﬁrst we review the impact of changes in exogenous variables on
the consumption-wealth ratio, the rate of growth of wealth of the domestic
economy, and welfare, since most of the results are standard10.T h e n w e
c o m p a r et h er e s u l t so fa no p e ne c o n o m yw i t ht h o s eo fac l o s e de c o n o m y .
10We refer to Turnovsky (1997, Ch. 11) for the analysis of the impact of production
risk and public spending on portfolio shares and on the variance of the rate of growth of
the domestic economy.
163.1 Consumption
The optimal consumption-wealth ratio shown in equation (22) is standard
in the literature11: the consumption function is a linear function of we-
alth. First, we review how consumption responds to changes in exogenous
variables that are not directly related to risk or to the inﬂuence of the public
sector. Thus a higher subjective discount rate, β, increases consumption-
wealth ratio, because the domestic representative agent ﬁnds more attractive
to dedicate a higher proportion of wealth to consumption, thus reducing
investment. In addition, a higher gross rate of return of the asset port-
folio, ρ, raises (reduces) consumption-wealth ratio if γ < (>)0 and does not
change if γ =0 . That is the overall result of two opposite eﬀects, substitu-
tion and income eﬀects. A higher gross rate of return of the asset portfolio
has always a negative substitution eﬀect since consumption becomes less
attractive whereas investment is more attractive. The income eﬀect on the
consumption-wealth ratio originated by a higher gross rate of return of the
asset portfolio is equal to unity: it makes possible to raise both actual and
future consumption. If γ < (>)0 then income (substitution) eﬀect dominates
substitution (income) eﬀect and if γ =0the two eﬀects compensate each
other. From here onwards whenever we get that the result depends on the
sign of the parameter γ only we focus on the case where γ < 0,f o rb e i n gt h e
most relevant situation empirically.
Second, we study the inﬂuence of variables related to risk, but not aﬀected
by the behavior of the public sector. Thus the eﬀect of a higher coeﬃcient
of risk aversion, γ, on consumption is ambiguous. Additionally, a higher
variance of the rate of growth, σ2
w,o, reduces consumption-wealth ratio if
γ < 0. Substitution and income eﬀects arise again: totally diﬀerentiating
equation (22) we can easily show that an increase of the variance of the
rate of growth is equivalent to a fall in the gross rate of return of the asset
portfolio, ρ,o f0.5[1− γ(1 + η)]. Analogous conclusion applies to the impact
of a higher variance of domestic productivity shocks, σ2
y,ah i g h e rv a r i a n c e
of foreign productivity shocks, σ2
y∗,or a higher covariance between domestic
and foreign productivity shocks, σyy∗, on consumption-wealth ratio.
Third, we analyze the role of the public sector. Consumption-wealth ratio
decreases as the size of the public sector, g, increases, for γ < 0.A ni n c r e a s e
in the size of the public sector is equivalent to a fall in the gross rate of
return of the asset portfolio of 1. I na d d i t i o n ,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h ev a r i a n c e
of public spending shocks, σ2
z, diminishes consumption-wealth ratio when
11See Merton (1969) for the pioneer work in continuous time with uncertainty. We refer
to Turnovsky (1996; 1997, Ch. 11; 1999) for more details on the impact of changes in
exogenous variables on consumption-wealth ratio.
17γ < 0. An increase in the variance of public spending shocks is equivalent
to a fall in the gross rate of return of the asset portfolio of 0.5[1− γ(1 + η)],
since the variance of the rate of growth increases. In contrast, if either
the covariance between domestic productivity shocks and domestic public
spending shocks, σyz, or the covariance between foreign productivity shocks
and domestic public spending shocks, σy∗z, increase then consumption-wealth
ratio increases for γ < 0. That is due to a reduction in the variance of the
rate of growth of the domestic economy.
For the case that the utility function is logarithmic the consumption







already found in Turnovsky (1996, 1999). This implies that a higher weight
of public consumption in the utility function, η, reduces unambiguously the
consumption-wealth ratio. A higher value of η increases the attractiveness of
public consumption in relation to private consumption, given the exogenous
size of the public sector. In addition, any other variable (risk, for example)
does not change consumption-wealth ratio and the consumption function in
an open economy is equal to that in a closed economy.
3.2 Growth
The mean rate of growth of assets achieved in equilibrium, given by (26), is
standard in the literature12.F i r s t ,w ef o c u so nt h ei m p a c to fv a r i a b l e st h a t
do not refer either to risk or to the public sector on the rate of growth of
assets. Thus a higher subjective discount rate, β, reduces unambiguously
the rate of growth since dedicating resources to consumption becomes more
attractive whereas investment is discouraged. In addition, a higher gross rate
of return of the asset portfolio, ρ, increases the rate of growth, even though
consumption-wealth ratio may rise.
Second, we study the inﬂuence of variables related to risk, but not aﬀected
by the behavior of the public sector. Thus a change in the parameter γ
generates an ambiguous eﬀect on the growth rate. Departing from ψo =
ρ−g−(C/W)o, this model shows that an increase in the variance of domestic
productivity shocks, σ2
y, shifting investment towards foreign capital, tends to
increase the rate of growth, on the one hand, if α∗ > α. On the other hand,
12We refer to Turnovsky (1996; 1997, Ch. 11; 1999) again for more details on the impact
of changes in exogenous variables on the rate of growth of wealth.
18the growth-enhancing eﬀect is reinforced when γ < 0 since consumption-
wealth ratio falls due to an increase in σ2
y (Turnovsky, 1997, p. 442). Similarly,
an increase in the variance of the foreign productivity shocks, σ2
y∗,m a k i n g
domestic capital more attractive, tends to increase the rate of growth if
α > α∗. Again the positive eﬀect on the rate of growth is strengthened
if γ < 0: consumption-wealth ratio falls due to an increase in σ2
y∗.
Third, we analyze the impact of the public sector on the rate of growth.
It is easy to show that a higher size of the public sector, g, reduces un-
ambiguously the rate of growth of the economy, even though consumption-
wealth ratio may fall. A higher variance of domestic public spending, σ2
z,
increases the rate of growth of the economy for γ < 0, because consumption-
wealth ratio falls (Turnovsky, 1997, p. 444). In contrast, we get the opposite
conclusions when either the covariance of domestic productivity and public
spending shocks, σyz, or the covariance of foreign productivity shocks and
public spending shocks, σy∗z,i n c r e a s e s .
Fourth, in the case of a logarithmic utility function the growth rate is
given by the expression




Thus a higher value of the parameter η increases unambiguously the rate of
growth of assets of the domestic economy. Even though it seems counter-
intuitive at ﬁrst glance, the reason behind is that a higher weight of public
consumption reduces consumption-wealth ratio, as we saw in the previous
section, thus increasing the rate of accumulation of assets of the economy,
given the exogenous size of the public sector. In addition, the rate of growth
of domestic wealth does not have to be equal in an open economy compared
to a closed economy, as we will see below in more detail.
Finally, we conclude that most of the results are standard in the literature,
even though they must be adjusted to include utility-enhancing public con-
sumption. As Turnovsky (1997, p. 432) puts it, “With identical preferences
and portfolios, diﬀerences in the international growth rates of wealth and
therefore of consumption are due entirely to diﬀerences in the respective size
of government, g − g∗, in the two economies. If the size of government is
uniform, then the equilibrium growth rates, ψ and ψ
∗,w i l lb ei d e n t i c a l ” .
However, the parameter η plays here an important role in the model to
account for diﬀerences in the rates of growth as well. This implies that,
having the representative agents of both economies identical preferences,
portfolios and sizes of the public sector, diﬀerences in the growth rates of
both economies can be explained in terms of diﬀerences in the weight of
19public consumption in the utility functions of both economies. Additionally
we have shown that economies which assign a higher weight to public con-
sumption in their utility function will have higher growth rates due to lower
consumption-wealth ratios.
3.3 Welfare
Economic welfare is measured by the value function we have used to solve
the problem of intertemporal optimization, given by equation (32). Taking
the total diﬀerential of equation (32) we obtain, after some algebra, that13
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where we can observe that changes in the optimal consumption-wealth ratio
and the (exogenous) size of the public sector have an impact on welfare.
First, a higher optimal consumption-wealth ratio can improve or deterio-
rate the welfare of the domestic representative agent. That is due to the fact
that the value function can take either positive or negative values, depending
o nt h es i g no ft h ec o e ﬃcient γ.S i n c e C/W and g are positive in equation
(32) then γV (W) > 0. For the case γ < 0 then anything that increases the
optimal consumption-wealth ratio elevates the welfare of the representative
agent. Thus, for example, a higher subjective discount rate, increasing the
optimal consumption-wealth ratio, generates higher welfare if γ < 0.
Second, the size of the public sector is an important factor inﬂuencing the
welfare of the representative agent. Thus a higher size of the public sector
can increase or reduce the welfare of the domestic representative agent, even
though it reduces unambiguously the rate of growth. The crucial point lies
on whether g Q ηC/W.I f g<ηC/W,t h e na ni n c r e a s eo ft h es i z eo f
the public sector augments the welfare of the representative agent. That is
due to the fact that the marginal utility derived from public consumption
is higher than the marginal utility derived from private consumption. If
g = ηC/W, then an increase of the size of the public sector does not alter
the welfare of the representative agent because the marginal utility derived
from public consumption is equal to the marginal utility derived from private
consumption: it is the size of the public sector that maximizes welfare, as
we will see in the next section. Finally, if g>ηC/W,t h e na ni n c r e a s eo f
the size of the public sector reduces the welfare of the representative agent
13Please note that the optimal consumption-wealth ratio, given by equation (22),
depends on the size of the public sector, g, as well.
20because the marginal utility derived from public consumption is lower than
the marginal utility derived from private consumption. These results can be
related with the conclusions established in Turnovsky (2000, p. 438): “Thus
we infer that increasing the growth rate by reducing government expenditure
is not necessarily welfare improving. This will be the case only if initially g
is above its optimum”. We will see below that this is completely consistent
with the analysis of the size of the public sector that maximizes the welfare
of the representative agent.
3.4 Open economy versus closed economy
In order to compare the results of an open economy with those of a closed
economy it is convenient to calculate the diﬀerence between the variance of
t h eg r o w t hr a t ei na no p e ne c o n o m ya n dt h a ti nac l o s e de c o n o m y .T h u si f


















y − αα∗σyy∗ − ασyz + α∗σy∗z
∆
,
is the share of the domestic portfolio materialized in foreign capital that
minimizes the variance of the growth rate given by equation (24).
First, we can compare the consumption-wealth ratio in an open economy
with that in a closed economy. If we substract equation (28) from equation





















We see the diﬀerence between both consumption-wealth ratios depends on
the sign of the parameter γ only. Thus if γ < 0 then the consumption-wealth
ratio will be higher in an open economy than that in a closed economy,
assuming an interior solution for the value of portfolio shares. An easy way
to explain that result can be found focusing on the case nd = e nd,w h e r e




y∗ − αα∗σyy∗ + ασyz − α∗σy∗z
∆
, (41)
21denotes the share of the domestic portfolio materialized in domestic capital
that minimizes the variance of the rate of growth of wealth. In such a
situation we get from equation (39) that the variance of the growth rate
in an open economy is lower than that in a closed economy, σ2
w,o < σ2
w,c.A s
we saw above, a reduction of the variance of the growth rate is equivalent to
an increase in the gross rate of return of the asset portfolio. That, in turn,
originates a negative substitution eﬀect and a positive income eﬀect on the
consumption-wealth ratio. If γ < 0 t h ei n c o m ee ﬀect is stronger than the
substitution eﬀect and the consumption-wealth ratio in an open economy is
higher than that in a closed economy. Additionally, the higher the value of
the optimal share of the domestic portfolio materialized in foreign capital,
n∗
d, the higher the diﬀerence between the results of an open economy with
those of a closed economy.
Second, we can compare the rate of growth in an open economy with
that in a closed economy departing from the equation (11) corresponding to
an open economy and substracting from it that corresponding to a closed
economy
ψo − ψc = n
∗
d(α














We see that the rate of growth in an open economy can be higher than, equal
to or lower than that in a closed economy, depending on the signs of the two
t e r m si n( 4 2 ) . F o re x a m p l e ,w ec a ne s t a b l i s hf o c u s i n go nt h ec a s ew h e r e
γ < 0,t h a t :
• If α ≥ α∗ t h e nt h er a t eo fg r o w t hi na no p e ne c o n o m yw i l lb el o w e rt h a n
that in a closed economy. The reason behind it is that the consumption-
wealth ratio in an open economy is higher than that in a closed economy
and, additionally, if α ≥ α∗ then the gross rate of return of the asset
portfolio in an open economy, ρ, is lower than or equal to the marginal
physical product of the domestic capital.
• If α < α∗ t h e nt h er a t eo fg r o w t hi na no p e ne c o n o m yc a nb eh i g h e r
than, equal to or lower than that in a closed economy.
Table 2.2. sums up the comparison between the rate of growth in an open
economy with that in a closed economy given by equation (42).
22Table 2.2. Comparing rates of growth
γ > 0 γ =0 γ < 0
α > α∗ ψo Q ψc ψo < ψc ψo < ψc
α = α∗ ψo > ψc ψo = ψc ψo < ψc
α < α∗ ψo > ψc ψo > ψc ψo Q ψc
Finally, we can compare the welfare of the domestic representative agent
in an open economy with that in a closed economy. Since we have shown
above in equation (40) that the consumption-wealth ratio in an open eco-
nomy is higher than that in a closed economy for γ < 0, then going back to
the value function given by equation (32) we can establish that the welfare of
the domestic representative agent is higher in a risky open economy than in
a risky closed economy. This result adds insights to those shown in Obstfeld
(1994) and Turnovsky (1997, Ch. 11), where they analyze the impact on
welfare when changing from a domestic closed economy with low-yield and
no risk (or relatively low risk) assets to an open economy with high-yield and
high-risk assets, among other things. Obstfeld (1994, p. 1326-27) showed
that “international risk-sharing can yield substantial welfare gains through
its positive eﬀect on expected consumption growth. The mechanism linking
global diversiﬁcation to growth is the attendant world portfolio shift from
safe, but low-yield, capital into riskier, high-yield capital”. Additionally,
Turnovsky (1997, p. 439) showed that for a logarithmic utility function “the
higher growth rate more than oﬀsets the additional risk, and the opportunity
to invest in a higher return, higher risk foreign asset improves welfare”.
However, we should note that our conclusion is not based on low risk-high
risk considerations, but on closed economy-open economy considerations. In
addition, our result hinges on the sign of the parameter γ again: we get the
opposite result about welfare if γ > 0, for example.
4 THE OPTIMAL SIZE OF THE PUBLIC
SECTOR
We have analyzed the equilibrium of the world economy assuming an exoge-
nous size of the public sector so far. Now we obtain the size of the public
sector that maximizes the welfare of the domestic representative agent or, for
short, the optimal size of the public sector. We discuss whether maximizing
welfare implies maximizing growth or not. Then we analyze the eﬀect of
changes in exogenous parameters on the optimal size of the public sector, on
consumption-wealth ratio, on growth, and on welfare, provided that the size
of the public sector is optimal. Finally, we compare the results of an open
23economy with those of a closed economy.
Formally, we have to diﬀerentiate partially the expression in the right
hand side of the Bellman equation (14) with respect to g,w h e r eG = gW,







which combining with the ﬁrst order condition equation (15) implies that the
optimal size of the public sector, b g, must satisfy the following condition




which is identical to Turnovsky (1996, p. 60; 1999, p. 888).14 Equation
(43) implies that the marginal utility of public consumption must be equal
to the marginal utility of private consumption when both public and private
consumption are optimally chosen.
Combining equation (43) with (22) we calculate the optimal size of the
public sector, the consumption-wealth ratio, and the growth rate when public
consumption is optimally chosen in an open economy
ˆ go =
η
[1 − γ(1 + η)](1 + η)
{β − γ(1 + η)ρ
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Please note that whenever we refer to the optimal size of the public sector
in general we will use the term b g and whenever we refer only to the optimal
size in an open economy we will use b go.
Additionally, we obtain the optimal size of the public sector, the consumption-
wealth ratio, and the rate of growth rate when public consumption is optimally
chosen in a closed economy
14We should note that the optimal size of the public sector, ˆ g, is not exactly identical to
that shown in Turnovsky (1999). However, it is identical in the sense that in both cases
the optimal ratio of public consumption to private consumption is given by G/C = η.
24ˆ gc =
η
[1 − γ(1 + η)](1 + η)
{β − γ(1 + η)α
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Finally, in the case of a logarithmic utility function we ﬁnd that the





which is equal to the (deterministic) optimal size of the public sector obtained
by Turnovsky (1996, p. 60) and very similar to Turnovsky (1999, p. 888).
Then it is easy to show that private consumption-wealth ratio plus the
optimal size of the public sector is given by
C
W
+ˆ g = β, (47)
where optimal consumption-wealth ratio is given by equation (37) above.
Therefore, we get a standard result in the literature again: (private plus
public) consumption-wealth ratio is equal to the subjective discount rate.
4.1 Growth vs. welfare maximizing
Now we can compare the optimal size of the public sector with the size that
maximizes the rate of growth. Going back to equation (26) it is straight-
forward to calculate that the size of the public sector that maximizes the
rate of growth is zero. The intuition behind the result is immediate. Public
spending is utility-enhancing but it does not aﬀect the productivity of the
economy. Therefore, since public spending does not enhance growth directly
b u ti ti m p o s e sas a c r i ﬁce, then the size of the public sector that maximizes
growth should be zero. The optimal size of the public sector is clearly higher
than that the size that maximizes the rate of growth. Both objectives are
not equivalent.
254.2 Analysis of the optimal size
First, we focus on the inﬂuence of changes in exogenous variables that do not






[1 − γ(1 + η)](1 + η)
> 0,
we can observe that a higher subjective discount rate increases the optimal
size of the public sector, because public consumption becomes more attractive.
In addition, the eﬀect of a higher gross rate of return, ρ,o nt h eo p t i m a ls i z e





[1 − γ(1 + η)]
,
where a higher gross rate of return of the asset portfolio will raise the
optimal size of the public sector for γ < 0. An increase in the gross rate
of return originates a positive income eﬀect on public consumption (allowing
to dedicate more resources to public consumption) stronger than the nega-
tive substitution eﬀect (public consumption becoming less attractive while
investing more attractive).
Second, we analyze the impact of changes in exogenous variables that
are related to risk, but not related to the behavior of the public sector. An
increase in the parameter γ has an ambiguous eﬀect on the optimal size of






we show that a higher variance of the growth rate, σ2
w,o, reduces the optimal
size of the public sector if γ < 0. A higher variance of the rate of growth
is equivalent to a fall in the gross rate of return of the asset portfolio, ρ,a s
we showed above. That conclusion can be easily extended for the impact of
a higher variance of domestic productivity shocks, σ2
y, a higher covariance
between domestic and foreign productivity shocks, σyy∗,o rah i g h e rv a r i -
ance of foreign productivity shocks, σ2
y∗. For example, if shocks become
less idiosyncratic in the EMU (that is, σyy∗ increases) then the optimal size
of the public sector should be lower for γ < 0. These results are in clear
contrast to those found in Turnovsky (1999, pp. 888-889). He ﬁnds that,
26for a logarithmic utility function, a higher domestic risk increases unambi-
guously the optimal size of the public sector, whereas the impact of a higher
foreign risk depends on whether the domestic economy holds positive stocks
of foreign capital or not.
Third, we focus on the impact of changes in variables related to the
behavior of the public sector. Then we easily show that whatever increases
the variance of the rate of growth, be a higher variance of domestic public
spending, σ2
z, be a lower covariance between domestic (foreign) productivity
shocks and domestic public spending, σyz (σy∗z), should reduce the optimal
size of the public sector if γ < 0,a sw es h o w e di n( 4 8 ) .
Finally, focusing on the logarithmic case, we ﬁnd that diﬀerentiating






2 > 0, (49)
which intuitively seems straightforward.
4.3 Consumption and growth
If we analyze the inﬂuence of changes in diﬀerent exogenous parameters on
consumption-wealth ratio and growth when the size of the public sector is
optimal, then most of the qualitative results obtained when the size of the
public sector was exogenously given do not change at all, even though the
quantitative results do change. However, some results deserve attention.
Restricting ourselves to the case of a logarithmic utility function, then it
c a nb ee a s i l ys h o w nt h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nt h ep a r a m e t e rη, in addition to raising
the optimal size of the public sector unambiguously [see equation (49)],
reduces in the same amount the private consumption-wealth ratio, given
by equation (37). Going back to equation (47) above, then a change in the
parameter η modiﬁes the distribution of total consumption spending between
private and public spending. Increasing the optimal size of the public sector
“crowds out” private consumption-wealth ratio one-to-one. Only variations
in the subjective discount rate change private plus public consumption-wealth
ratio. Changes in any other variable do not modify either total consumption
spending or the distribution between both types of consumption. Therefore,
a change in the parameter η does not change the rate of growth of wealth,
in contrast to the conclusions we got in Section 3.2 above.
274.4 Open economy versus closed economy
Now we can compare the optimal size of the public sector in an open economy
with that in a closed economy, as well as the consumption-wealth ratio, the
rate of growth, and welfare in the same way that we did when the size of the
public was exogenously given in Section 3.4.
First, if we substract equation (45) from equation (44) we get using
equation (39), after some algebra, that
ˆ go − ˆ gc = −0.5ηγ∆n
∗2
d .
We focus on the case nd = e nd,w h e r ee nd is the variance-minimizing share
of the domestic portfolio, given by equation (41). However, the results do
not depend on that assumption. Then we get from equation (39) that the
v a r i a n c eo ft h eg r o w t hr a t ei na no p e ne c o n o m yi sl o w e rt h a nt h a ti na
closed economy, σ2
w,o < σ2
w,c. As we saw above, a reduction of the variance
of the growth rate is equivalent to an increase in the gross rate of return
of the asset portfolio. That, in turn, originates a stronger positive income
eﬀect than the negative substitution eﬀect: the optimal size of the public
sector in an open economy is higher than that in a closed economy, which is
what the empirical evidence suggests (Rodrik, 1998; Alesina and Wacziarg,
1998). Additionally, the higher the value of the optimal share of the domestic
portfolio materialized in foreign capital, n∗
d,t h eh i g h e rt h ed i ﬀerence between
the optimal size of the public sector in an open economy with that in a closed
economy. The result we have obtained is equal to that shown in Turnovsky
(1999), but diﬀers signiﬁcantly in the conditions that are necessary to reach
that conclusion: we get that result for γ < 0, which is what the empirical
evidence suggests, and he shows that the optimal size in an open economy
is higher than that in a closed economy if the utility function is logarithmic,
provided that the domestic economy holds positive stocks of foreign capital
in a small open economy.
Second, similarly we can get the diﬀerence between the consumption-















We can show again if γ < 0 then the consumption-wealth ratio in an open
economy is higher than that in a closed economy. Therefore, provided that
the size of the public sector is optimal, we get the same qualitative results
28as those obtained when the size of the public sector was exogenously given.
However, the quantitative results do change slightly.
Third, comparing the rate of growth in an open economy with that in a
closed economy, the results will be qualitatively identical to those obtained
in the case where the size of the public sector was exogenously given. Thus
we will not pursue the analysis further.
Finally, we can easily show that welfare is higher in a risky open economy
than in a risky closed economy if γ < 0, as we showed above in Section 3.4.
5C O N C L U S I O N S
The impact of risk and utility-enhancing public spending on the economy
is a topic that have been analyzed extensively. However, the models have
been focused almost exclusively on closed or small open economies. In this
paper we have analyzed a two-country stochastic AK growth model, based
on Turnovsky (1997, Ch. 11), where the consumption good provided by the
public sector is utility-enhancing [Barro (1990)]. The results obtained can
be divided into four groups.
First, having characterized the world equilibrium, we have analyzed the
impact of changes in diﬀerent exogenous variables on the consumption-wealth
ratio, the rate of growth of wealth, and welfare. Most of the results are
standard in the literature. However, we have shown that a higher weight
of public consumption in the utility function raises the rate of growth, due
to a reduction in the consumption-wealth ratio, given the exogenous size of
the public sector. Therefore, diﬀerent preferences towards utility-enhancing
government expenditure produce diﬀerent rates of growth, other things being
equal. Additionally, even though increasing the size of the public sector is
always growth-reducing, it is welfare-augmenting when the size of the public
sector is below its optimal size.
S e c o n d ,w eh a v ec o m p a r e dt h er e s u l t si na no p e ne c o n o m yw i t ht h o s eo f
a closed economy. Thus we have shown that consumption-wealth ratio in an
open economy should be higher than that in a closed economy. In the simplest
case where the portfolio share is equal to that which minimizes the variance
of the rate of growth, an open economy achieves a lower variance of the rate
of growth thus encouraging consumption. Then we have discussed whether
the rate of growth of assets in an open economy should be higher than in a
closed economy. Even though the model does not oﬀer clear-cut results, we
have shown that an open economy will unambiguously grow slower than a
closed economy if the marginal physical product of domestic capital is higher
than that of foreign capital. In addition, since welfare depends basically on
29the consumption-wealth ratio, welfare is higher in a risky open economy than
in a risky closed economy, thus extending the results in Obstfeld (1994) and
Turnovsky (1997, Ch. 11).
Third, we have derived the welfare-maximizing size of the public sector
and compared it to the size that maximizes growth. Then we have analyzed
the impact of changes in diﬀerent exogenous variables on the optimal size of
the public sector. Thus we have shown that whatever increases the variance
of the rate of growth (a higher covariance between domestic and foreign
productivity shocks, for example) reduces the optimal size of the public
sector, in contrast to the results found in Turnovsky (1999). In addition,
a higher value of the parameter η increases the optimal size of the public
sector just in the same amount private consumption-wealth ratio falls, so
that public plus private consumption-wealth ratio and the rate of growth
of wealth do not change. That changes substantially our conclusions with
respect to those when the size of the public sector was exogenously given.
Next, we have established that the optimal size of the public sector in an
open economy is higher than that in a closed economy under more general
conditions than those established in Turnovsky (1999). The lower variance
of the growth rate obtained in an open economy tends to raise public con-
sumption.
Finally, we should point out possible avenues for future research. We
could relax the assumption of continuous budget equilibrium and introduce
public bonds in the model. However, that would increase enormously the
complexity of the model. Introducing money is also an interesting element
that could be integrated in a two-country world economy. Additionally,
public spending could be productive also, and not only utility enhancing.
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